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85 
REPUBLICANISM AND NATURAL RIGHTS 
AT THE FOUNDING 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth). 
Jud Campbell2 
Americans mostly take constitutional legitimacy for granted, 
leaving the Supreme Court and its illustrious bar to do their work 
without concern for political philosophy. A great strength of 
Randy Barnett’s scholarship, including his latest book, Our 
Republican Constitution,3 is his sustained effort to dislodge that 
philosophical complacency. Barnett calls on us to consider why 
our Constitution is legitimate before we decide how it should be 
interpreted. 
In this sense, Barnett brings us closer to an eighteenth-
century intellectual world commonly known as “the Founding.” 
Constitutionalism at the Founding was intimately tied to 
questions of political philosophy, based in part on the idea of 
“natural rights.” Constitutional historians have disparaged the 
importance of natural rights,4 but Barnett deserves credit for 
 
 1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. 
 2. Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks 
Randy Barnett, Larry Kramer, Corrina Lain, Jack Preis, and the other contributors to this 
symposium for helpful suggestions, and he especially thanks Michael McConnell for 
ongoing and extraordinarily helpful conversations about this topic. 
 3. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
 4. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 88–95 (1986); see also Isaac Kramnick, 
Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 629, 629–35 (1982) (surveying how 
a generation of “republican” scholarship downplayed the influence of Lockean ideas at 
the Founding). 
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pushing back. Natural rights featured prominently in Founding-
Era constitutional thought.5 
But what were natural rights? Today we tend to think about 
natural rights as non-positivist claims to limits on governmental 
authority—typically claims derived from religion, morality, or 
logic. The claims might be legal (e.g., “natural rights are 
enforceable in court”), or they might simply be philosophical 
(e.g., “a government that disrespects natural rights is unjust or 
illegitimate”). But these “rights,” by their very definition, exist 
independent of governmental control. Indeed, that is what makes 
them “natural.” 
Yet language often shifts over time, and it might turn out that 
“natural rights” carried a very different meaning over two 
centuries ago. As historian Jonathan Gienapp cautions, “the first 
key to understanding the American Founding is appreciating that 
it is a foreign world.”6 
This Essay sketches an alternative—and perhaps quite 
unfamiliar—view of Founding-Era natural rights, their 
relationship to governmental authority, and their enforceability.7 
With the exception of certain “rights of the mind,”8 natural rights 
were not really “rights” at all, in the sense of being determinate 
legal privileges or immunities. Rather, embracing natural rights 
meant embracing a mode of reasoning. And the crux of the idea—
in stark contrast to the modern notion of “natural rights”—was to 
create a representative government that best served the public 
good. 
 
 5. See p. 67 (collecting invocations of natural rights in various state declarations of 
rights). 
 6. Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 942 (2015). Gienapp attributes this insight to the work of others, 
including Bernard Bailyn, Quentin Skinner, and Gordon Wood. Id. at 943, 945. 
 7. This Essay describes a historical system of thought based on the stated political 
philosophy of American political elites in the late eighteenth century. References to “the 
Founders,” their “goals,” and so forth should be read accordingly. This Essay does not 
defend the claim that this system of thought was universally accepted at the Founding, nor 
that it ought to be incorporated into modern constitutional interpretation. This Essay thus 
reacts to Barnett’s portrait of the Founders, but it does not engage in the same genre of 
historical writing. See Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST. 
COMMENT. 31, 38 (2016). 
 8. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 174 
(Rutland, J. Lyon 1793). This Essay largely ignores these rights, which I will address in 
future work. 
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Individual liberty mattered, of course, and the Framers 
indeed wanted to insulate politics from the whims of capricious 
majorities. But the overriding goal of their efforts was to improve 
representation, not lessen it, and to ensure that the general 
welfare was the government’s paramount concern. The Founding-
Era idea of “natural rights” thus called for judicial deference to 
legislative judgments, and it favored broader governmental power 
just as much as limits to that power. In short, natural rights called 
for good government, not necessarily less government. 
SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORY 
The Founders spoke about their “natural rights” with a 
familiarity that Americans have long since lost. Recovering that 
concept requires going back to its origins in social-contract theory. 
Social-contract theory, which underpinned most of 
Founding-Era constitutionalism,9 was organized around different 
stages of political development. The theory began by imagining 
what things would be like without a government—a condition 
known as a “state of nature.” Properly understood, this inquiry 
was hypothetical rather than historical.10 The idea of a state of 
nature was “abstract,” James Otis explained in his famous Rights 
of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, acknowledging that 
“men come into the world and into society at the same instant.”11 
Yet that idea remained useful, Otis insisted, because “the natural 
and original rights of each individual may be illustrated and 
explained in this way better than in any other.”12 
 
 9. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 112 (1991); Thad W. Tate, The Social 
Contract in America, 1774-1787: Revolutionary Theory as Conservative Instrument, 22 WM. 
& MARY Q. 375 (1965).  
 10. See John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 193, 213 (1993) 
(“The social contract was a legal fiction explaining the stipulations under which individuals 
left the state of nature and created societies.”); see, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *47 (“This notion, of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is 
too wild to be seriously admitted.”); James Madison, Essay on Sovereignty (1835), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 568, 570 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (describing the 
“hypothesis” that social-contract theory “supposes”); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF 
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 14 (Windham, John Byrne 1795) (“I doubt 
whether a state of nature ever did, or can exist; but I can imagine such a state, and thence 
infer the advantages derived from a union in society.”). 
 11. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 
28 (Boston, Edes & Gill 1764). 
 12. Id. 
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In a state of nature, individuals were thought to have certain 
freedoms or liberties—commonly known as “natural rights.”13 By 
definition, these “rights” existed without reference to 
governmental authority. They were simply freedoms that 
individuals enjoyed vis-à-vis each other, subject only to the 
confines of “natural law”—roughly defined as the requirements 
of reason, justice, and morality.14 As James Wilson explained, 
“natural liberty” was the “right” of every person to act “for the 
accomplishment of those purposes, in such a manner, and upon 
such objects, as his inclination and judgment shall direct; provided 
he does no injury to others; and provided some publick interests 
do not demand his labours.”15 
Social-contract theory then hypothesized that individuals, 
recognizing the benefits of collective action, would “join in one 
body . . . to manage, with their joint powers and wills, whatever 
should regard their common preservation, security, and 
happiness.”16 This imagined agreement was a “social contract” (or 
“social compact”), and it required the consent of every 
individual.17 The result was a single entity—a body politic—
composed of all the members of the political society. In the words 
of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, “The body politic is 
formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social 
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, 
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed 
by certain laws for the common good.”18 
Like the state of nature, the social contract was imaginary but 
nonetheless had powerful implications for the proper scope of 
governmental power. “HOWEVER the historical fact may be of a 
 
 13. See, e.g., James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1053, 1055–56 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
 14. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 922–30 (1993) (describing natural rights). 
 15. Wilson, supra note 13, at 1055–56. 
 16. James Wilson, Of Municipal Law, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 
549, 553–54 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. 2, chap. 9, § 130 (5th ed.; London, A. Bettesworth 1728) 
(individuals surrender “as much . . . natural Liberty . . . as the Good, Prosperity, and Safety 
of the Society shall require”). 
 17. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 10, at 570; JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (Philadelphia, 
Hall & Sellers 1787); Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted (Feb. 23, 1775), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 88 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961). 
 18. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Preamble. 
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social contract,” English jurist Richard Wooddeson explained, 
“government ought to be, and is generally considered as founded 
on consent, tacit or express, on a real, or quasi, compact. This 
theory is a material basis of political rights; and as a theoretical 
point is not difficult to be maintained.”19 
At the next stage of political development, the body politic 
formed a system of government in an agreement known as a 
“constitution.” Unlike the social contract, which required 
unanimous consent, the constitution required only the consent of 
the body politic, based on majority rule.20 Even after the 
formation of government, however, the body politic still retained 
supreme political authority, or “sovereignty.”21 James Wilson 
summarized the idea nicely in his law lectures: 
While those, who were about to form a society, continued 
separate and independent men, they possessed separate and 
independent powers and rights. When the society was formed, 
it possessed jointly all the previously separate and independent 
powers and rights of the individuals who formed it, and all the 
other powers and rights, which result from the social union. 
The aggregate of these powers and these rights composes the 
sovereignty of the society or nation.22 
This was the crux of popular sovereignty—that sovereignty 
resided in the body politic, or “the people themselves,” and that 
 
 19. RICHARD WOODDESON, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE TREATED OF IN THE 
PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 22 (London, 
T. Payne & Son 1783). Barnett nicely grapples with this tricky aspect of social-contract 
theory. See p. 74 (“[I]n the absence of such express consent, we must ask what each person 
could be presumed to have consented to.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 10, at 570; ADAMS, supra note 17, at 6. 
 21. See, e.g., James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative 
Authority of the British Parliament (1774), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 
supra note 16, at 3, 5 n.c. (“The right of sovereignty is that of commanding finally—but in 
order to procure real felicity; for if this end is not obtained, sovereignty ceases to be a 
legitimate authority.”). 
 22. Wilson, supra note 16, at 556; see also, e.g., Theophilus Parsons, Essex Result 
(1778), in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 366 (Boston, 
Ticknor & Fields 1861) (“When men form themselves into society, and erect a body politic 
or State, they are to be considered as one moral whole, which is in possession of the 
supreme power of the State. This supreme power is composed of the powers of each 
individual collected together, and VOLUNTARILY parted with by him.”); LOCKE, supra 
note 16, at bk. 2, chap. 8, § 96 (“For when any number of Men have, by the consent of 
every individual, made a Community, they have thereby made that Community one Body, 
with a Power to act as one Body, which is only by the Will and Determination of the 
Majority.”). 
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members of the government exercised power merely as agents of 
the people. 
To be sure, as Barnett highlights, James Wilson’s opinion in 
Chisolm v. Georgia famously described individuals as “original 
sovereigns,” noting that “[t]he sovereign, when traced to his 
source, must be found in the man.”23 But Wilson clarified that his 
use of the term “sovereign” was idiosyncratic,24 referring to the 
source of governmental legitimacy rather than the possessor of 
supreme political authority. Putting aside terminology, Wilson’s 
point was conventional. The people, as a collective body politic—
not legislatures or kings, and not individuals—possessed the 
supreme power under a social contract, even though that 
authority was founded on the presumed consent of every 
individual.25 
FOUNDING-ERA RIGHTS 
In modern legal thought, the rights listed in the Constitution 
stem from a common source: their enumeration. For the 
Founders, however, bills of rights declared rather than created 
most rights.26 And these declarations typically included two 
different types of rights, each with its own origin and structure. 
Declarations of rights, one commentator noted in 1787, combined 
protections for “natural liberty . . . retain[ed]” with “some 
particular engagements of protection, on the part of 
government.”27 Or, as Thomas Jefferson put it, bills of rights 
 
 23. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456, 458 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) 
(emphasis added). 
 24. Id. at 454 (“I intend not to substitute new [terms]; but the expressions themselves 
I shall certainly use for purposes different from those, for which hitherto they have been 
frequently used.”). 
 25. See id. at 454–58; Wilson, supra note 16, at 556–62; Pennsylvania Ratification 
Convention Debates (Dec. 4, 1787) (remarks of James Wilson), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 493–94 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) 
(“[I]n the United States the people retain the supreme power . . . and exercise it either 
collectively or by representation.”). 
 26. See Jack N. Rakove, The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF 
RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 181, 187 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 
2007); John Phillip Reid, The Authority of Rights at the American Founding, in THE 
NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra, at 67, 97; Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 171, 171 (1992). 
 27. An Old Whig No. 4, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 27, 1787, in 13 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 497, 501 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); see REID, supra note 4, at 93 (although 
terminology was fluid, “there is no doubt that people in the eighteenth century 
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declared both “unceded portions of right,” like “freedom of 
religion,” and “also certain fences which experience has proved 
peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of 
right,” like “trial by jury, Habeas corpus laws, [and] free 
presses.”28 
These different types of rights corresponded to the different 
stages of political development in social-contract theory: 
 1. In a state of nature, individuals had natural rights. Natural 
rights were easy to identify because they were things that people 
could do without a government, like eat, pray, or speak. “A 
natural right is an animal right,” Thomas Paine succinctly 
explained, “and the power to act it, is supposed, either fully or in 
part, to be mechanically contained within ourselves as 
individuals.29 Or, as Zephaniah Swift put it, natural rights were 
“the enjoyment and exercise of a power to do as we think proper, 
without any other restraint than what results from the law of 
nature, or what may be denominated the moral law.”30 
 
distinguished between natural rights and positive rights possessed by contract or 
prescription”); see, e.g., BENJAMIN RUSH, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PRESENT 
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN FOUR LETTERS TO THE PEOPLE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 3 (Philadelphia, Styner & Cist 1777) (noting the combination of “natural 
and civil rights” in the Pennsylvania bill of rights); Federal Farmer No. 6 (Dec. 25, 1787), 
in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 979, 
983–84 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004) (“Of rights, some are natural and unalienable, 
of which even the people cannot deprive individuals: Some are constitutional or 
fundamental; these cannot be altered or abolished by the ordinary laws; . . . and some are 
common or mere legal rights, that is, such as individuals claim under laws which the 
ordinary legislature may alter or abolish at pleasure.”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (June 8, 
1789) (remarks of Rep. James Madison) (noting the presence of “natural right[s] and 
“positive rights” in his proposed bill of rights). The first two volumes of the Annals were 
printed twice—first in the 1830s using headings that read “Gales & Seaton’s History of 
Debates in Congress” (as part of an effort described in 1843 as “the sample volume[s],” 
The History and Debates of Congress, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Jan. 27, 1843, at 2), and second in 
the 1840s using headings that read “History of Congress” (as part of a continuous series 
covering congressional debates from 1789 to 1824). Citations in this Essay are to the 
“History of Congress” volumes. 
 28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971). Elsewhere, Jefferson 
referred to the latter category of rights as “instruments for administering the government, 
so peculiarly trust-worthy, that we should never leave the legislature at liberty to change 
them.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 676, 678 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
 29. Common Sense [Thomas Paine], Candid and Critical Remarks on Letter 1, Signed 
Ludlow, PA. JOURNAL AND THE WEEKLY ADVERTISER, June 4, 1777, at 1. 
 30. 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 
15 (New Haven, S. Converse 1822). 
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 2. When forming a political society in a social contract, 
individuals agreed to retain some of their natural rights. These 
retained natural rights, William Blackstone noted, comprised 
“natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) 
as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the 
public.”31 
 3. Either when forming a political society or when 
constituting a government, the people might also recognize 
certain fundamental positive rights to limit governmental power.32 
These positive rights, unlike natural rights, were legal privileges 
or immunities defined in terms of governmental action or 
inaction, like the rights of due process, habeas corpus, and 
confrontation. 
 4. Finally, after the formation of a political society and 
government, lawmakers could create ordinary positive rights, 
which we now refer to as common-law or statutory rights. These 
“mere legal rights,” Federal Farmer explained, were “such as 
individuals claim under laws which the ordinary legislature may 
alter or abolish at pleasure.”33 
Recovering the meanings and enforceability of Founding-
Era rights thus requires attention to their type. 
RETAINED NATURAL RIGHTS 
Retained natural rights were not determinate legal rights. 
Rather, with the exception of certain “rights of the mind” (i.e., the 
freedoms of conscience and thought),34 these were aspects of 
natural liberty that were subject to regulation only in the interest 
 
 31. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125. 
 32. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 9–34 (2004). Quite confusingly, some 
Founders occasionally referred to certain positive rights as founded on the “nature” of 
man or the “nature” of government, occasionally leading them to describe positive rights 
like the right to a jury as “natural.” See Reid, supra note 26, at 94; CHIPMAN, supra note 8, 
at 112 (“Both [natural rights and civil rights] are natural rights, and equally guaranteed to 
him by the laws of his nature.”); see, e.g., Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 
16, 1788) (remarks of George Mason), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1328 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1993) (describing “certain great and important rights” against legislative power as 
“the great rights of human nature”). 
 33. Federal Farmer No. 6, supra note 27, at 984. 
 34. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 174 (“r[i]ghts of the mind . . . can never justly be 
subject to civil regulations”). 
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of the political society and its members, and only with the consent 
of the people.35 
The Founders were emphatic that natural liberty could be 
restrained only in the public interest.36 As Theophilus Parson 
explained, “Each individual . . . surrenders the power of 
controuling his natural alienable rights, ONLY WHEN THE GOOD 
OF THE WHOLE REQUIRES it.”37 St. George Tucker put the point 
more dramatically, writing that whenever natural liberty “is, by 
the laws of the state, further restrained than is necessary and 
expedient for the general advantage, a state of civil slavery 
commences immediately.”38 Indeed, many described the 
protection of natural liberty as “the principal aim of society.”39 
Yet the Founders were equally insistent that natural liberty 
should be restrained when doing so promoted the common good. 
Natural liberty, Nathaniel Chipman declared, “must be in a just 
compromise with the convenience and happiness of others.”40 
This was a common refrain. “[N]o government . . . can exist,” 
James Wilson asserted, “unless private and individual rights are 
subservient to the public and general happiness of the nation.”41 
 
 35. See, e.g., OTIS, supra note 11, at 30 (“The Colonists being . . . entitled to all the 
rights of nature . . . are not to be restrained in the exercise of any of these rights, but for 
the evident good of the whole community . . . and if [natural liberty is] taken from them 
without their consent, they are so far enslaved.”); ADAMS, supra note 17, at 123 (laws must 
be “made with common consent . . . for the general interest, or the public good”). 
 36. For discussions of the “common good,” “public interest,” and “general welfare,” 
see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 53–
65, 608 (2d ed. 1998); WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY 
ERA 216–27 (rev. ed. 2001). 
 37. Parsons, supra note 22, at 366. 
 38. St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia (1796), in VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 402, 407 (1999). 
Americans commonly referred to the deprivation of natural rights as “slavery.” 
 39. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124.  
 40. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 174–75. 
 41. JAMES WILSON, THE SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH DELIVERED BY JAMES WILSON, 
ESQ. EXPLANATORY OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PROPOSED FŒDERAL 
CONSTITUTION . . . 8 (Philadelphia, Thomas Bradford 1787); see, e.g., New York 
Ratification Convention Debates (June 24, 1788) (remarks of Alexander Hamilton), in 22 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1863 (John 
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (“There must be a perpetual accommodation and sacrifice of 
local advantage to general expediency.”); Civis [David Ramsay], To The Citizens of South 
Carolina, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, Feb. 4, 1788, in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 21, 22 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (“[I]n society, every individual must sacrifice a part of his 
natural rights; the minority must yield to the majority, and the collective interest must 
controul particular interests . . . .”); Noah Webster, An Oration on the Anniversary of the 
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Individual liberty mattered, of course, but the ultimate object—
“the first law of every government”—was “the happiness of the 
society.”42 “True liberty,” James Iredell noted, “consists in such 
restraints, and no greater, on the actions of each particular 
individual as the common good of the whole requires.”43 
Proper respect for the public interest meant that lawmakers 
had to consider everyone’s interests, and not merely those of 
particular individuals or factions.44 The government, in other 
words, should not be “adverse to the rights of other citizens,” as 
James Madison put it in Federalist No. 10, or act by “disregarding 
the rights of another.”45 But this principle required only equal 
consideration of and respect for of the natural rights of others; it 
did not make those “rights” absolute or immutable. During the 
First Congress, for instance, Federalist leader Theodore Sedgwick 
explained that he “felt no difficulty” in defending governmental 
authority “to interfere with contracts, public and private,” 
whenever failing to do so would endanger “the public welfare.”46 
Indeed, Americans reiterated over and over again that the 
common good often required the sacrifice of individual rights.47 
To be sure, the Founders disagreed at times about how much 
natural liberty to maintain. But for the most part, the “liberal” 
and “republican” traditions that Jack Balkin highlights in his 
 
Declaration of Independence (1802), in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805, at 1220, 1228 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 
1983) (“Of course, by the very constitution of society, the will of each member is restrained 
by the laws of general utility, or common good, the details of which are to be regulated by 
the supreme power.”). 
 42. Wilson, supra note 21, at 5.  
 43. James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of 
Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 1792), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 308, 310 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988). 
 44. See, e.g., ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 125 
(2d ed., London, J. Darby 1704) (“The Laws that aim at the publick Good, make no 
distinction of Persons.”); The Impartial Examiner No. 1, VA. INDEP. CHRONICLE, Feb. 27, 
1788, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
420, 420 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) (government officials should 
have “no other view than the general good of all without any regard to private interest . . . 
[and] take equal care of the whole body of the community, so as not to favor one part more 
than another”).  
 45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57, 60 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphases added). 
 46. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1169 (Feb. 10, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick).  
 47. See supra notes 40 to 43 and accompanying text. But see BARNETT, p. 75 (“[T]he 
common good . . . consists of the protection of each person’s life, liberty, and property.”). 
5 - CAMPBELL_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17  8:59 AM 
2017] REPUBLICANISM AT THE FOUNDING 95 
 
contribution to this symposium48 were simply different 
conceptions of how to pursue the public good—and were not yet 
competing theories about the first principles of government.49 
Only later did many Americans shift “from a commitment to the 
public welfare to an interest in wealth accumulations,”50 making 
libertarian policies not just a means of pursuing the general 
welfare but an end in themselves. 
For some Founders, legislative authority to restrain natural 
liberty in the public interest effectively meant that individuals 
surrendered all of their natural liberty to the control of the 
political society. “[M]ankind have found it necessary to give up 
[natural] liberty,” Connecticut jurist Zephaniah Swift wrote, “and 
unite in society for mutual assistance, protection, and defence: 
hence the origin of civil rights.”51 Or, as Melancton Smith asked 
rhetorically at the New York ratification convention, “What is 
government itself, but a restraint upon the natural rights of the 
people?”52 Yet others insisted that Americans had given up none 
of their natural rights. In a republic, Alexander Hamilton 
declared in Federalist No. 84, “the people surrender nothing.”53 
Federalist commentaries frequently echoed this theme.54 
 
 48. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 31. 
 49. See Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 
WM. & MARY Q. 334, 339 (1982) (contrasting the idea of “a uniform general interest” with 
the view “that the competing ambitions of self-interested individuals would produce the 
greatest public benefit”); JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE 
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 183 (1992) (describing self-interest, from a liberal perspective, 
as a “benign regulator of human conduct”); see also WOOD, supra note 36, at xi (“It is 
important to remember that the boxlike categories of ‘republicanism’ and ‘liberalism’ are 
essentially the inventions of us historians, and as such they are dangerous if heuristically 
necessary distortions of a very complicated past reality.”). 
 50. James L. Hutson, Virtue Besieged: Virtue, Equality, and the General Welfare in 
the Tariff Debates of the 1820s, 14 J. EARLY REP. 523, 525 (1994). 
 51. SWIFT, supra note 30, at 15; see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 
(“[E]very man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty.”); LOCKE, 
supra note 16, at bk. 2, chap. 9, § 131 (“Men when they enter into Society, give up the 
Equality, Liberty, and executive Power they had in the state of Nature, into the hands of 
the Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the Society shall 
require.”). 
 52. New York Ratification Convention Debates (June 25, 1788) (remarks of 
Melancton Smith), in 22 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 41, at 1879. 
 53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 45, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 54. See, e.g., Remarker, INDEP. CHRONICLE, Dec. 27, 1787, in 5 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 527, 529 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998); Virginia Ratification Convention Debates 
(June 16, 1788) (remarks of George Nicholas), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
32, at 1334. 
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Based on these statements, we might suspect that Americans 
sharply disagreed about the scope of retained natural liberty. But 
this conclusion would be mistaken. The conflict was semantic 
rather than substantive, with broad agreement that the 
government could restrict natural liberty in the public interest. 
Ostensible disagreements about the retention of natural 
rights stemmed partly from differing views about the scope of 
natural liberty in a state of nature. In particular, the idea that 
people sacrificed some of their natural rights upon entering 
society came under attack from those who thought that man was 
“sociable by the laws of his nature” and thus had “no right to 
pursue his own interest, or happiness, to the exclusion of that of 
his fellow men.”55 Consequently, because natural rights were 
already circumscribed by social obligations, it was unnecessary to 
give up any natural rights upon entering a political society. “To 
give up the performance of any action, which is forbidden by the 
laws of moral and social nature,” Nathaniel Chipman insisted, 
“cannot be deemed a sacrifice.”56 
Others thought that natural liberty was fully preserved 
because of the representative structure of the government.57 An 
example will illustrate the point. Does a person who sells land give 
up a right? In a sense, yes—the seller no longer owns the property. 
But in another sense, no—a right of alienation is exercised, but the 
seller has not given up the right to own land. Discussions of 
natural rights at the Founding straddled the same linguistic 
ambiguity. And the reason why is crucially important: 
representative institutions could consent to restrictions of natural 
liberty on behalf of individuals. 
To be sure, natural rights were individual rights. Indeed, the 
Founders widely viewed the rights to life, liberty, and property as 
among the inalienable natural rights of individuals. Thus, as the 
 
 55. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 75; see Hamburger, supra note 14, at 945–46; see also, 
e.g., 1 THOMAS RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 36 (Cambridge, J. 
Bentham 1754) (“It is therefore the law of [man’s] nature, that he should live in society 
with others of his own species[,] . . . that he should join with them in a common interest, 
[and] that he should bind himself to them in such a manner as to labour with them for a 
general good.”). 
 56. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 74. 
 57. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.  
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Virginia Assembly declared in 1774, an individual’s property 
could not be “wrested from him . . . without his own Consent.”58 
But the Founders equally accepted that an individual’s “own 
Consent” could be granted by a representative legislature. 
“[Social-contract] theory,” James Madison explained, “supposes, 
either that it was a part of the original compact, that the will of the 
majority was to be deemed the will of the whole, or that this was 
a law of nature, resulting from the nature of political society 
itself.”59 Therefore, “the sovereignty of the society as vested in & 
exercisable by the majority, may do anything that could be 
rightfully done by the unanimous concurrence of the members.”60 
Some aspects of natural liberty, like having thoughts, were 
understood to be beyond an individual’s control and therefore 
could not properly be restrained even with consent.61 But an 
individual’s other retained natural rights were subject to restraint 
through “laws to which he has given his consent, either in person, 
or by his representative.”62 
 
 58. Virginia House of Burgesses, Memorial to the House of Lords, VA. GAZETTE, 
July 21, 1774, at 2. 
 59. Madison, supra note 10, at 570. 
 60. Id. (emphasis added); see also James Wilson, Of Man, as a Member of Society, in 
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 16, at 621, 639 (“In society, when 
the sentiments of the members are not unanimous, the voice of the majority must be 
deemed the will of the whole. That the majority, by any vote, should bind not only 
themselves, but those also who dissent from that vote, seems, at first, to be inconsistent 
with the well known rule[ ] . . . that no one can be bound by the act of another, without his 
own consent. But . . . society is constituted for a certain purpose; and . . . every thing 
necessary for carrying it on shall be done.”); SIDNEY, supra note 44, at 69 (“[W]hen a 
People is, by mutual compact, join’d together in a civil Society, there is no difference as to 
Right, between that which is done by them all in their own Persons, or by some deputed 
by all, and acting according to the Powers receiv’d from all.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 10, at 571 (“[T]he reserved rights of individuals (of 
conscience for example) in becoming parties to the original compact [are] beyond the 
legitimate reach of sovereignty, wherever vested or however viewed.”); N.H. CONST. of 
1784, pt. 1, art. 4 (“Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature unalienable, 
because no equivalent can be given or received for them. Of this kind are the RIGHTS OF 
CONSCIENCE.”); Parsons, supra note 22, at 365 (identifying inalienable rights as “the rights 
of conscience,” or “duties, for the discharge of which we are accountable to our Creator 
and benefactor, which no human power can cancel”); JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, 
CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS OF THE PRESS . . . 11 (New York, 
Johnson & Stryker 1801) (“All men are endowed, by nature, with the power of thinking; 
yet have they no controul over their thoughts.”). Notably, the Founders used the term 
“inalienable” in different ways—sometimes referring to natural rights that could not be 
controlled without consent, and other times referring to a narrower set of natural rights 
that could not be restrained even with consent.  
 62. Alexander Hamilton, A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress (Dec. 
15, 1774), in 1 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 45, 47. Barnett 
attributes to the Founders the view that implied consent was valid only so long as the 
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Consequently, most retained natural rights were individual 
rights that could be collectively defined and controlled. The 
Declaration of Independence referred to the inalienability of 
natural rights in this sense.63 Property was an inalienable natural 
right, for instance, and therefore Americans could not divest 
control of their property to an unaccountable king or 
Parliament.64 But the Declaration’s invocation of natural rights 
had nothing to do with constraints on the powers of representative 
legislatures. Inalienability undergirded the American stance 
about who could collect taxes and regulate property, but labeling 
something as a “natural right” did not suggest well-defined 
limitations on governmental power.65 
In sum, although American elites spoke in radically different 
ways about how much natural liberty was retained in the social 
contract, they widely agreed on the substance—that retained 
natural rights could be regulated in the public interest by the 
people or their representatives. 
FUNDAMENTAL POSITIVE RIGHTS 
In contrast to retained natural rights, some positive rights 
imposed firm obligations and constraints on governmental 
authority. These fundamental positive rights included a slew of 
 
natural rights of individuals were preserved. See pp. 74–78. But natural rights were 
preserved by having a representative legislature act in the public interest, not necessarily 
by making portions of natural liberty immune from governmental control. 
 63. See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE 
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 112 (1996); see also, e.g., OTIS, 
supra note 11, at 37 (“The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his 
property, without his consent in person, or by representation.”). 
 64. The standard American definition of representative consent required that each 
geographical area have actual representatives, thus rejecting the British notion of virtual 
representation. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011). Yet American elites generally held fast to virtual 
representation with respect to other characteristics like age, gender, race, and property 
ownership. 
 65. Thus, for instance, recognition of the inalienable right of conscience did not 
necessarily conflict with governmental support for religion, use of religious oaths, and so 
forth. To be sure, some invoked natural rights in arguing “that Religion is wholly exempt 
from [governmental] cognizance.” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against 
Religious Assessments (ca. June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: 
CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1973). 
But this position turned on a series of intermediate arguments, not simply the inalienability 
of conscience. Cf. Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 384 (“It is indeed stressing the obvious to conclude 
that, in [Madison’s] mind at least, . . . the establishment of a religion by law is not per se an 
infringement of the equal rights of conscience.”). 
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customary rules, like the guarantee of a jury trial, the right of 
habeas corpus, and the ban on press licensing.66 They were, as 
Thomas Jefferson put it, “certain fences which experience has 
proved particularly efficacious against wrong, and rarely 
obstructive of right.”67 These rights operated more in the mode of 
“rights as trumps” that is familiar to modern lawyers. 
Not all common-law or statutory rights enjoyed 
“fundamental” status. In general, legislatures could change laws 
whenever they liked. What typically made rights “fundamental” 
in the English tradition was, somewhat circularly, a widespread 
belief that they were inviolable—a consensus that often emerged 
fully only after political contests over the fundamentality of the 
right, like debates about confrontation in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries or about press licensing in the late 
seventeenth century. “Like other forms of customary law,” Larry 
Kramer observes, this fundamental law “was uncertain and open-
ended” in some respects, but “[i]t did not follow that nothing was 
fixed.”68 In the United States, the enumeration of rights in written 
constitutions or declarations of rights also became an important 
indicator of their fundamentality.69 
For present purposes, though, the crucial point is that some 
positive rights had fundamental status and were very similar to 
our modern notion of constitutional rights. These rights, like the 
right to a jury trial and the ban on ex post facto laws, operated as 
legal privileges or immunities that could be defended in court 
against legislative encroachment. 
USING RIGHTS TO CONSTRUE POWERS 
Barnett uses the “prior existence” of natural rights to favor a 
narrow construal of governmental power—and especially federal 
 
 66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at 132. 
 67. Id.; see also KRAMER, supra note 32, at 9–34. At least in theory, these rights had 
a positivist origin—they were not simply philosophical abstractions. See Federal Farmer 
No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 1051, 1057–58 
(referring to positive rights as “stipulated rights” that “individuals acquire by compact” 
and must be claimed “under compacts, or immemorial usage”). 
 68. KRAMER, supra note 32, at 14.  
 69. See, e.g., Federal Farmer No. 6, supra note 27, at 984 (defining fundamental 
positive rights as ones that “individuals claim under the solemn compacts of the people, as 
constitutions, or at least under laws so strengthened by long usage as not to be repealable 
by the ordinary legislature”). 
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power (pp. 78, 172-173, 189-195). Founding-Era evidence, 
however, shows a more complicated relationship between rights 
and powers, depending largely on the type of right at issue. 
Many Founders thought that fundamental positive rights 
limited governmental authority even when unenumerated.70 
Consider, for instance, the rule against press licensing—a 
principle commonly known as the “liberty of the press.”71 This 
freedom, one commentator explained during the ratification 
debates, was “a privilege, with which every inhabitant is born;—a 
right . . . too sacred to require being mentioned.”72 
Americans had two different accounts of why it was 
unnecessary to enumerate fundamental positive rights. Some 
thought that the social contract guaranteed positive rights in 
return for individuals’ sacrifice of control over their natural 
liberty.73 Consequently, these rights were guaranteed at a pre-
constitutional stage, making their constitutional enumeration 
unnecessary. Meanwhile, others thought that these positive rights 
were implicitly excepted from constitutional grants of power.74 
Enumerated powers, in other words, were more like slices of 
Swiss cheese, with the holes representing a lack of authority to 
abridge certain rights, than like slices of American cheese, with 
 
 70. See KRAMER, supra note 32, at 41; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten 
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).  
 71. See Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (remarks of 
James Wilson), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 455 (“what is meant by 
the liberty of the press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it”). 
 72. Uncus, MD. JOURNAL, Nov. 9, 1787, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 76, 78 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1983). 
 73. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (remarks of Rep. James Madison) (referring 
to certain “positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the compact”); 
Parsons, supra note 22, at 367 (referring to “the equivalent that every man receives [in the 
social contract] as a consideration for the rights he has surrendered,” which positive rights 
are “unassailable by the supreme power” even prior to the creation of a constitution); cf. 
John Adams, Reply to A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans, in 2 PAPERS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 193, 195 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 2003) (“There are therefore certain 
fundamental Laws, and certain original Rights, reserved expressly or tacitly, by every 
People in their first Confederation in Society, and erection of Government.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Fœderal Constitution, PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 1787, in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 362, 363 (“[T]he Liberty of the Press would 
have been an inherent and political right, as long as nothing was said against it.”); A Citizen 
of New-York [John Jay], An Address to the People of the State of New York (Apr. 15, 1788), 
in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 922, 933 (mentioning in a discussion of 
press freedom and jury rights that “silence and blank paper neither grant nor take away 
any thing”). 
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authority to do anything that might facilitate the use or 
effectiveness of those powers. 
Not everyone held this view about the non-necessity of 
enumeration. Some Founders favored an equitable construction 
of statutes—not of constitutional powers—to avoid conflicts with 
certain unenumerated rights,75 without giving these rights the 
status of supreme law.76 When recognized, however, positive 
rights with fundamental status restricted governmental power. 
By contrast, retained natural rights did not impose strict 
limits on the powers of representative bodies. Rather, with the 
exception of the freedoms of conscience and thought,77 individuals 
surrendered control of their natural rights for the common good. 
Consequently, some Founders plausibly used social-contract 
theory to favor broader governmental power than the “literal 
meaning” of constitutional text might otherwise suggest.78 
A notable example is Alexander Hamilton’s defense of 
federal power to charter a national bank. The scope of federal 
power, he argued, was “a question of fact to be made out by fair 
reasoning & construction upon the particular provisions of the 
constitution—taking as guides the general principles & general 
ends of government.”79 It was thus a “sound maxim of 
construction,” Hamilton insisted, “that the powers contained in a 
constitution of government . . . ought to be construed liberally, in 
advancement of the public good.”80 The ends of federal power, he 
 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (“Where rights 
are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of 
the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible 
clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.”); cf. 
Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean 
Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 20–21 (2010) (supporting 
this approach but without fully using this Essay’s taxonomy of rights). 
 76. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398–99 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, 
J.). 
 77. As rights that could not be given up even with consent, the Founders treated the 
freedoms of conscience and thought as unique among natural rights. See supra note 61. 
 78. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an 
Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 
106 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965). 
 79. Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 105. Indeed, Hamilton argued that some federal powers flowed “from the 
nature of political society”—that is, from the existence of a national body politic—rather 
than from particular enumerated powers. Id. at 100. James Wilson had taken a similar 
position under the Articles of Confederation. See James Wilson, Considerations on the 
Bank of North America (1785), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 
16, at 60, 66 (“The United States have general rights, general powers, and general 
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was arguing, should be construed to promote “the general 
interests of the Union.”81 Moreover, Hamilton wrote, the 
existence of federal sovereignty indicated federal authority “to 
employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the 
attainment of the ends of [its] power.”82 
In a way that scholars have previously overlooked, the 
implicit reservation of natural rights in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments reinforced Hamilton’s conclusion. To be sure, these 
amendments proved that federal power was limited,83 thus 
 
obligations, not derived from any particular states, nor from all the particular states, taken 
separately; but resulting from the union of the whole.”). A “further criterion” when 
construing federal power, Hamilton continued, was to ask: “Does the proposed measure 
abridge a preexisting right of any State, or of any individual? If it does not, there is a strong 
presumption in favour of its constitutionality . . . .” Hamilton, supra note 78, at 107. These 
“preexisting right[s]” of individuals likely referred to longstanding positive rights, not 
natural liberty. See supra notes 70–74, infra note 105, and accompanying text. In any event, 
Hamilton never suggested a paramount concern for individual rights. Hamilton, supra, at 
109 (noting that Congress could “alter the common law of each state in abridgement of 
individual rights”). 
 81. This quotation is from Resolution VI, which set out the scope of federal 
legislative power prior to revisions in the committee of detail. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see JACK N. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 178 
(1996). Modern proponents of national power have invoked Resolution VI either in 
defense of freestanding federal authority to solve problems that require collective action, 
see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010), or as a structural principle that “underlies 
and should inform the proper construction of all of Congress’s enumerated powers,” JACK 
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 377 (2011). In response, Kurt Lash criticizes 
nationalists for drawing on the private intentions of the Framers rather than the public 
meaning of the Constitution, pointing out that Resolution VI did not survive the drafting 
process and played virtually no role in shaping public understandings of the Constitution. 
Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective 
Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123 (2012). This 
Essay shows how the general principles of social-contract theory supplied Federalists with 
a stronger basis for claiming federal power to address federal problems. 
 82. Hamilton, supra note 78, at 98; see also, e.g., A.B., HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 
1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 54, at 596, 597 (the “[federal] government 
is to possess absolute and uncontroulable powers” but those powers extend only to 
“national objects: such as concern the whole in union, and therefore ought to be under the 
government and controul of the whole”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, supra note 45, at 195 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to 
the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, . . . free from every other 
control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.”). 
 83. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1901 (Feb. 2, 1791) (remarks of Rep. James Madison). 
It seems to me that Madison was arguing simply that enumerated federal powers should 
be construed to maintain limits on federal authority—not that those powers ought to be 
construed “strictly” whenever liberty is restricted. Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 242 (rev. ed. 2014); KURT T. 
LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 68–69 (2009). 
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answering the Anti-Federalist objection that “appoint[ing] a 
legislature, without any reservation of the rights of individuals, 
surrender[s] all power . . . to the government.”84 The absence of 
an enumerated power over the liberty of locomotion,85 for 
instance, meant that the federal government lacked plenary 
authority to restrict individual movement in the public interest. 
Nonetheless, because locomotion was a retained natural right of 
individuals, it was not within the exclusive domain of state control 
either. Rather, Congress and state legislatures could each restrict 
individual movement when pursuing their respective powers. The 
implicit reservation of natural rights in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments thus suggested parity in the means of federal and 
state authority.86 
ENFORCING RIGHTS 
Today we tend to think about the judicial enforcement of 
unenumerated or indeterminate rights through the lens of the 
“counter-majoritarian difficulty.”87 Because these rights constrain 
majority rule without the benefit of textual clarity, their judicial 
definition and enforcement can exist only in uneasy tension with 
the core democratic principle of self-rule.88 
Quite brilliantly, then, Barnett opens his historical account 
by embracing the Constitution’s undemocratic origins. The 
Founders, he writes, “blamed the problems in the states under the 
Articles of Confederation on an excess of democracy” (p. 26). 
With this move, Barnett uses our undemocratic past to turn the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty into a virtue. The Founders’ 
 
 84. Agrippa No. 12 (Jan. 15, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 54, at 
720, 722. 
 85. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 2097 (July 5, 1798) (remarks of Rep. John Allen) 
(mentioning “the liberty of locomotion, of going where I please”). 
 86. In this way, I tend to agree with Barnett that the Ninth Amendment directly 
protects only individual rights, not collective states’ rights, see Randy E. Barnett, Kurt 
Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008), but because federal powers 
were limited and because retained natural rights could generally be collectively defined 
and controlled, the reservation of rights implicit in the Ninth Amendment could readily 
have had a state-empowering effect, cf. Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the 
Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895 (2008) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment 
protects both individual rights and collective states’ rights). 
 87. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 88. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[J]udges are unelected and unaccountable, and . . . the legitimacy of their 
power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal judgment.”). 
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apparent scorn for democracy bolsters his originalist case for the 
primacy of rights and for their judicial enforcement. 
Missing, however, is any evidence that the Founders actually 
supported the judicial protection of retained natural rights, either 
directly or through a narrow construal of governmental power. 
Instead, the historical record shows that they preserved retained 
natural rights principally through constitutional structure, giving 
legislators, not judges, nearly complete responsibility for 
determining their proper scope. In this way, the standard 
approach to guarding retained natural rights diverged 
significantly from the enforcement of fundamental positive rights. 
It is certainly true that by the late 1780s American political 
elites were deeply skeptical of majoritarian politics and had 
largely abandoned the British view that elected assemblies were 
“the full and exclusive representatives of the people.”89 Instead, 
Americans embraced the idea that legislatures represented the 
people only imperfectly, that other governmental officials were 
also agents of the people, and that the people themselves had an 
active role to play in exercising sovereignty.90 At the same time, 
cynicism grew among elites regarding the capacity of the people 
themselves to pursue the common good. People frequently cared 
only about their individual interests, James Madison wrote in 
1787, thus leading to “unjust violations of the rights and interests 
of the minority” because of a lack of neutrality toward the various 
interests in society.91 As Madison later put it, “the great danger 
lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the Legislative 
body.”92 
 
 89. WOOD, supra note 36, at 597. “In America,” Wood explains, “the people were 
never really represented in the English sense of the term.” Rather, “representation of the 
people” was “always tentative and partial.” Id. at 600. 
 90. See id. at 597–600; KRAMER, supra note 32, at 35–72; Wilson, supra note 16, at 
556–58. On the importance of constitutional ratification conventions, see Tate, supra note 
9, at 379–85. But see Giles Hickory [Noah Webster], Government, N.Y. AM. MAG., Feb. 1, 
1788, in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 738, 739 (“The sense of the people 
is no better known in a convention, than in the Legislature.”). 
 91. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 
9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 345, 355, 355–57 (Robert 
A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1975); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra 
note 45, at 60–61 (James Madison) (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of 
popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the 
public good and the rights of other citizens.”). 
 92. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (June 8, 1789) (remarks of Rep. James Madison). 
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Yet for the Founders, addressing these challenges called for 
better representation—not less of it. After all, restrictions of life, 
liberty, and property required the consent of the people. The goal 
of reform, therefore, was to find “a Republican remedy for the 
diseases most incident to Republican Government.”93 For 
instance, Madison famously speculated that an extended national 
sphere would break the society “into a greater variety of interests, 
of pursuits, of passions, which [would] check each other.”94 He 
also sought “a process of elections as will most certainly extract 
from the mass of the Society the purest and noblest characters 
which it contains.”95 The government, he hoped, would represent 
the entire society, and not simply the private interests of the 
majority. 
In this way, the Founders’ “anti-democratic” efforts did not 
reflect an understanding of “natural rights” as rigid constraints on 
governmental power. The good of the whole still took priority 
over private rights and interests. Rather, the Founders wanted to 
create a system of government that best pursued the public 
interest while retaining its representative form. And this effort, in 
turn, prompted creative thinking about institutional roles. 
With the demise of legislative sovereignty, for instance, 
American judges assumed a greater part in enforcing fundamental 
positive rights.96 The justification for this shift was 
straightforward. If judges identified a conflict between the will of 
the people (the principal) and the will of their representatives (the 
agents), the will of the people took priority.97 But constitutional 
commands were often unclear, and legislatures were much closer 
than judges to the people themselves. Judges in the Founding Era 
thus widely deferred to legislative judgments absent clear 
constitutional violations.98 (Importantly, the clarity of 
 
 93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 45, at 65 (James Madison) (emphasis 
added); see KRAMER, supra note 32, at 46–49. 
 94. Madison, supra note 91, at 357. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s 
Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999) (exploring Madison’s ideas on this topic and their 
broader reception, or lack thereof). 
 95. Madison, supra note 91, at 357. 
 96. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). 
 97. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 45, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 98. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140–42 (1893); Christopher R. Green, Clarity 
and Reasonable Doubt in Early State-Constitutional Judicial Review, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 
169, 172–83 (2015); John McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 880–
904 (2016). 
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constitutional commands did not depend solely on text but “drew 
on well-established principles of the customary constitution as 
well.”99) When a constitutional provision was unclear, Alexander 
Hamilton indicated in Federalist No. 84, its meaning “must 
depend on legislative discretion, regulated by public opinion.”100 
Consequently, judicial review at the Founding was not all or 
nothing. Some constitutional provisions, like the jury guarantee 
and the ban on ex post facto laws, functioned as legal rules 
governed largely by judicial decisions. Even without a bill of 
rights, judges sometimes viewed these principles as implied 
limitations on governmental power.101 (With enumerated rights, 
the will of the people was reflected in the enumeration of the 
right; with unenumerated rights, some thought that the will of the 
people was demonstrated by longstanding respect for the right.)102 
Meanwhile, other constitutional disputes—including many 
involving federalism—typically were not judicially managed and 
instead were left to political resolution.103 
It is no surprise, therefore, that judicial applications of 
retained natural rights were virtually nonexistent. Some judges 
still occasionally invoked social-contract theory.104 Justice Samuel 
Chase, for instance, used the theory to defend a presumption that 
fundamental positive rights implicitly limited legislative 
authority.105 But “natural rights” remained purely abstract. As 
Chase explained to a jury in 1803, 
I have long since subscribed to the opinion, that there could be 
no rights of man in a state of nature, previous to the institution 
of society. . . . It seems to me that personal liberty and rights, 
can only be acquired by becoming a member of a community, 
which gives the protection of the whole to every individual. . . . 
 
 99. KRAMER, supra note 32, at 99. 
 100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 45, at 580 n.* (Alexander Hamilton). 
Hamilton was writing about the scope of constitutional provisions in favor of the liberty of 
the press, which he described as lacking “any definition which would not leave the utmost 
latitude for evasion.” Id. at 580.  
 101. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., Federal Farmer No. 6, supra note 27, at 984; Federal Farmer No. 16, supra 
note 67, at 1057–58. 
 103. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also Osborn v. 
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 895–96 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(noting that powers Congress had exercised that were “not foreseen at the adoption of 
constitution” were nonetheless “within the range of [Congress’s] discretion, [and] aloof 
from judicial control, while unaffectedly exercised for the purposes of the constitution”). 
 104. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 105. See KRAMER, supra note 32, at 42–43. 
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[L]iberty, and rights, (and also property) must spring out of 
civil society, and must be forever subject to the modification of 
particular governments.106 
Thus, while some Founders used social-contract theory to defend 
implied constitutional boundaries, natural rights were not a 
source of determinate, judicially enforceable law. 
To be sure, social-contract theory required lawmakers to 
pursue only the public interest, thus imposing a substantive 
constraint on legislative power.107 Passing laws without regard for 
the general welfare, it bears emphasis, violated a central tenet of 
social-contract theory. But the difficulty of applying that standard 
left very little room for judicial oversight. According to Brutus, 
who described judicial review in more latitudinous terms than 
anyone else at the Founding,108 the principle that legislatures had 
to pursue the general welfare was “found, in practice, a most 
pitiful restriction” because “there [was] no judge between [the 
government] and the people,” and therefore “the rulers 
themselves must, and would always, judge for themselves.”109 
On rare occasion, judges hinted that their enforcement of 
legislative acts would, in the words of Spencer Roane, be bounded 
“by the constitutions of the general and state governments; and 
limited also by considerations of justice.”110 Suzanna Sherry asserts 
that Roane was embracing “broad judicial review and the 
principle that unjust or unreasonable legislation should not be 
enforced by judges.”111 But Roane clarified that only a “crying 
 
 106. Jury Instruction of Samuel Chase (May 2, 1803), in CHARLES EVANS, REPORT 
OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL CHASE . . . 60, 61–62 (Baltimore, Samuel Butler & 
George Keatinge 1805). 
 107. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Brutus No. 11 (Jan. 31, 1788), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 514 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1984) (“[Federal judges] will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that 
may from time to time come before them. And in their decisions they will not confine 
themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears 
to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution. The opinions of the supreme court, 
whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in 
the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications.”). 
 109. Brutus No. 6 (Dec. 27, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 108, at 
110, 115. 
 110. Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 346 (1809) 
(opinion of Roane, J.) (emphasis added). 
 111. Suzanna Sherry, Independent Judges and Independent Justice, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (1998). 
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grade of injustice” would warrant judicial invalidation.112 The 
standard rule at the Founding was that judges could not answer 
questions “of mere expediency or policy.”113 Nor could judges 
overturn a statute because of an impermissible legislative purpose 
absent a “high degree of certainty,” based principally on the 
statute itself.114 The combination of these principles meant that, 
both in theory and in practice, legislatures had virtually unfettered 
authority over most retained natural rights.115 
CONCLUSION 
In thinking about original meaning, Our Republican 
Constitution usefully counsels attention not merely to 
 
 112. Currie’s Adm’rs, 14 Va. at 350 (opinion of Roane, J.); see also Calder, 3 U.S. at 
388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“There are certain vital principles . . . which will determine and 
overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power.” (emphasis added)); Bank of 
State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 603 (Special Ct. 1831) (opinion of Green, J.) (“Some 
acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against the plain and obvious dictates of 
reason.” (emphasis added)). 
 113. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 1 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 500, 501 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 2009); 
see, e.g., Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805) (“[T]he judiciary are 
only to expound and enforce the law and have no discretionary powers enabling them to 
judge of the propriety or impropriety of laws.”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (June 8, 1789) 
(remarks of Rep. James Madison) (“it is for [Congress] to judge of the necessity and 
propriety” of laws). 
 114. Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 
1796 (2008). 
 115. Barnett criticizes this conclusion as overlooking diversity in Founding-Era 
thought. See Randy E. Barnett, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and 
Sovereignty of We the People, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 209, 210 (2016). With respect to 
judicial application of principles of “natural justice,” however, historical evidence seems 
to range from complete deference to legislative judgments, see, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 
(opinion of Iredell, J.); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 
81, at 78 (remarks of George Mason) (“[Judges] could declare an unconstitutional law 
void. But with regard to every law however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not 
come plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it 
free course.”), to robust deference to legislative judgments, see supra note 112 and 
accompanying text. In short, legislators had discretion with regard to how far natural rights 
should be restrained in promotion of the public good, and judges could, at most, step in 
only when it was clear that legislators had abused that discretion. For further discussion, 
see Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2017). Rather than addressing whether and how judges could limit 
legislatures to good-faith pursuit of the public interest, the evidence in Barnett’s response 
focuses on whether and how judges could require a nexus between enumerated and 
implied powers. See Barnett, supra, at 210–13. The relationship between these inquiries—
each of which might involve assessing pretext—is worth further thought. 
Cf. Nelson, supra note 114, at 1796 (noting the limited nature of Founding-Era judicial 
inquiries about legislative pretext). 
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constitutional text but also to Founding-Era political philosophy. 
For the Founders, constitutional interpretation often began with 
principles derived from social-contract theory. 
The Constitution’s preamble thus had a significance that we 
have largely forgotten. “We the People . . . do ordain and establish 
this Constitution.”116 These words emanated from social-contract 
theory, indicating the formation of a national body politic with 
sovereignty independent of the several states. As William Findley 
put it, “In the Preamble, it is said, ‘We the People,’ and not ‘We 
the States,’ which therefore is a compact between individuals 
entering into society, and not between separate states enjoying 
independent power and delegating a portion of that power for 
their common benefit.”117 
Exactly how a national body politic had emerged was 
puzzling. A social contract required the unanimous consent of 
individuals,118 and the Constitution certainly failed that test. Some 
nationalists insisted that a national body politic had existed ever 
since the Revolution. Others argued, perhaps more plausibly, that 
the sovereign people of the several states had voluntarily parted 
with some of their sovereignty and thereby formed a national 
body politic for certain collective purposes. And many 
proponents of states’ rights simply rejected the premise.119 The 
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson famously insisted in 1798, was 
merely a “compact under the style & title of a Constitution.”120 
This debate had profound importance. If the Constitution 
was merely a compact among sovereign states, and not a 
“constitution” within the meaning of social-contract theory, 
 
 116. U.S. CONST., Preamble (emphases added). 
 117. Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (remarks of 
William Findley), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 447–48; see also Luther 
Martin, Genuine Information No. 4 (Jan. 8, 1788), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 108, at 296, 297 (“It is in its very introduction declared to be a compact between the 
people of the United States as individuals . . . [rather than] by the States as States in their 
sovereign capacity.”). 
 118. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 119. For historical debates about the nature of the union, see Bernadette Meyler, 
Between the States and the Signers: The Politics of the Declaration of Independence Before 
the Civil War, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (2016); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s 
Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 615 (1995); H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: An Essay in 
Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689 (1994); Andrew C. McLaughlin, Social Compact 
and Constitutional Construction, 5 AM. HIST. REV. 467 (1900). 
 120. See The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 536 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003). 
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federal powers would have to be construed narrowly. The 
Federalist argument for broad incidental powers, Virginia 
congressman William Branch Giles commented during the 1791 
bank debates, “seem to me to apply to a government growing out 
of a state of society, and not to a government composed of 
chartered rights from previously existing governments, or the 
people of those governments.”121 
Indeed, Virginia jurist St. George Tucker used compact 
theory to justify a federal presumption of liberty. A “strict 
construction” of federal power was warranted, he insisted, 
“wherever the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or of 
private property may become the subject of dispute.”122 Far from 
basing this idea on a libertarian understanding of natural rights, 
however, Tucker defended his presumption of liberty on the fact 
that each individual had already “submitted himself” to the 
authority of state government, and federal power “might 
endanger his obedience” to state law.123 As Joseph Story noted, 
Tucker’s “whole reasoning [was] founded, not on the notion, that 
the rights of the people are concerned, but the rights of the 
states.”124 
On the other hand, if John Marshall was right that “it is a 
constitution we are expounding,”125 founded on an implicit 
national social contract, that conclusion potentially supported a 
broader construal of federal powers, and perhaps even the 
implied abrogation of some state authority. “[T]he powers 
contained in a constitution of government . . . ought to be 
construed liberally, in advancement of the public good,” 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1791.126 “This rule,” he continued 
 
 121. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1942 (Feb. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. William Branch Giles). 
 122. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States (1803), in VIEW 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 
38, at 101–02. Later in the same work, Tucker wrote that “every power which concerns the 
right of the citizen, must be construed strictly, where it may operate to infringe or impair 
his liberty; and liberally, and for his benefit, where it may operate to his security and 
happiness, the avowed object of the constitution,” id. at 246, without mentioning how to 
treat putative powers that impinge upon liberty while promoting security and happiness.  
 123. Id. at 102. 
 124. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 411 (1833). A presumption against powers “touch[ing] the rights of property, or 
of personal security, or liberty” was inappropriate, Story insisted, “in construing a 
constitution of government, framed by the people for their own benefit and protection.” 
Id. at § 413. 
 125. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis added). 
 126. Hamilton, supra note 78, at 105. 
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“does not depend on the particular form of a government or on 
the particular demarkation of the boundaries of its powers, but on 
the nature and objects of government itself.”127 
Far from settling methodological questions, however, 
construing powers “in advancement of the public good” 
intensified constitutional instability. As Joseph Priestley wrote in 
his Essay on the First Principles of Government, 
That the happiness of the whole community is the ultimate end 
of government can never be doubted, and all claims of 
individuals inconsistent with the public good are absolutely 
null and void; but there is a real difficulty in determining what 
general rules, respecting the extent of the power of government, 
or of governors, are most conducive to the public good.128 
Priestley’s description of this effort as “a real difficulty” was 
putting it lightly. “According to this rule,” Joseph Story later 
observed, “the most opposite interpretations of the same words 
would be equally correct, according as the interpreter should 
deem it odious or salutary.”129 Social-contract theory thus fueled 
constitutional conflict, stimulating extraordinary debates in 
Congress and among the broader American public over 
interpretive methodology and the proper scope of federal 
authority.130 
Lurking in the background of these debates was a silent 
harmony between republicanism and natural rights. With the 
exception of certain “rights of the mind,” natural rights were not 
determinate legal privileges or immunities that imposed fixed 
limitations on governmental power. Rather, retained natural 
rights were aspects of natural liberty that an individual could give 
up only through his own consent, either in person or by his 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, 
AND ON THE NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 57 (2d ed., 
London, J. Johnson 1771) (emphasis added). 
 129. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 411 (2d ed., 1851); see also 1 STORY, supra note 124, at § 411 (using the word 
“interpretator”). Story criticized this vacillating interpretive principle and preferred, 
within the “fair sense” of the text, an interpretation “which best follows out the apparent 
intention” of the people. Id. at § 413.  
 130. For congressional debates, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997). For broader constitutional and 
political debates, see JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS (1993). For debates about interpretive methods, 
see Gienapp, supra note 6. 
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representative, and only in the public interest. Most retained 
natural rights were therefore individual rights that could be 
collectively defined and controlled by legislatures, with virtually 
no room for judicial oversight. In the end, Founding-Era natural 
rights were not really “rights” at all, in the modern sense. They 
were the philosophical pillars of republican government. 
 
